Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for

your leadership in organizing these hearings and for a comprehensive

statement that really does set forward the major issues we must discuss.

I was an outspoken advocate for United States military action

against Iraq that culminated in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

I urged President Bush at a very early date to seek congressional

authorization for deployment of troops and the use of force in the

Persian Gulf. At the time, many in and out of the administration

feared the possibility of losing that vote. I believed all along the

votes would be there, but had the votes for authorization not been

there, it would have been far better to have known this at the beginning

rather than to be surprised down the road that the Nation

was not behind the President. A few weeks later, the House and

Senate did vote to authorize President Bush to use military force

against Iraq, and the administration benefited immensely from this

overt decision of the American people.

If President Bush determines that large-scale offensive military

action is necessary against Iraq, I hope that he will follow the lead

established by the previous Bush administration and seek congressional

authorization. The administration must be assured of the

commitment of the American people in pursuing policies and actions

in Iraq after focused and vigorous discussion and debate. It

is unfortunate that today, some 10 years after the gulf war, we still

face threats posed by Saddam Hussein. This did not necessarily

have to be the case.

On April 18, 1991, I wrote to President Bush urging him to send

our forces to Baghdad and to complete the job. He was gracious

enough to receive me in the White House to discuss that letter. I

believe that while we had the forces present, we should end the regime

of Saddam Hussein and build a democratic Iraq. And, for a

number of reasons, our President chose instead to pursue a policy

of containment. Those important reasons for that decision, then

and now, include our plans for the future of a post-Saddam-Hussein

Iraq and future stability of Iraq’s neighbors.

We must estimate soberly the human and economic costs of war

plans and postwar plans. I am under no illusion that this will be

an easy task. The President and the administration will have to

make the case to the American people regarding the threat posed

to the United States security by Saddam Hussein and the weapons

of mass destruction he appears intent on producing and potentially

utilizing against Americans and other targets.

But the President will also have to make a persuasive case to our

friends and allies, particularly those in the region. Simply put, Saddam

Hussein remains a threat to the United States, allied, and regional

security. However, the situation on the ground in the region

has changed since 1991, and it is not at all clear that the tactics

of that campaign should be re-employed today.

Ten years ago, the United States had done the military and diplomatic

spade work in the region. We had developed a war plan.

Allies in the region permitted the United States forces to launch

attacks from their territory. We had collected a coalition of willing

and able allies. Our allies were willing to pay for $48 billion of the

$61 billion cost. We were prepared to utilize the force necessary to

defeat Iraqi forces. And, most importantly, we had the support of

the American people. We have not yet determined if these same

conditions are present today. They might be, but we have not yet

engaged all the parties necessary to ensure a successful outcome.

At the end of the Persian Gulf war, the agreements surrounding

the cease-fire included an Iraqi commitment to destroy a stockpile

of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the ability to

produce them in the future. I fully supported this endeavor. Iraq’s

possession of weapons of mass destruction represents a potential

threat the world cannot ignore. On several occasions since the end

of the war, the United States and our allies have resorted to the

use of military force to counter the threat Iraq poses to its neighbors

and to the United States’ vital national-security interests.

Saddam Hussein has demonstrated his ability and willingness to

use weapons of mass destruction and spread instability through

military force against his own people and neighbors.

Unfortunately, the overriding priority of his regime has been the

maintenance of his own power. These hearings seek to shed light

on our policy alternatives. The administration understands that ultimately

it will have to make a case for its policy decisions. This

is not an action that can be sprung on the American people. Leaks

of military plans are dangerous to our security. But public debate

over policy is important to the construction of strong public support

for actions that will require great sacrifices from the American people.

I look forward to working closely with the chairman to lead this

debate and to lay some of the foundation of the coalescing of administration

and congressional thinking and support that will be

essential for a campaign against Saddam Hussein.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Cordesman, much of the argument about the

need to attack Iraq now is really based upon the thought that Dr.

Hamza suggested, that they could develop a nuclear capability by

2005, or even Ambassador Butler’s comment that at the end of the

gulf war or thereabouts, Iraq may have been within 6 months of

developing a nuclear weapon. If that is so, and given the point

you’ve made about the efficacy of biological and chemical weapons

being very difficult to estimate, the case for continuing the socalled

containment strategy is that Iraq has not been able to develop

weapons capable of providing a massive first strike capability.

And, as a matter of fact, the strategy apparently, as we see

it, is that Saddam would use these weapons defensively and simply

threaten the rest of the world with retaliation if an event occurred

that threatened him.

However, what is your judgment, leaving aside intelligence reports

that may help the committee or, more importantly, the President

and others, to determine the imminence of Iraq’s capability?

What is the case against simply continuing as we are now? If evidence

appeared that he had developed a nuclear weapon outside of

a covert situation, couldn’t we just reserve the right for preemptive

strikes or take action to try to eliminate that. Is there a big enough

threat that cannot be contained?

And then, second, if we adopt that strategy, is it possible we

could wind up with a policy with our allies and neighboring states

that in the event that Saddam did develop and did strike somebody

that we all attack together, as opposed to the current situation in

which almost all the neighbors, plus our NATO allies, are highly

skeptical of the efficacy of our initiating a strike at this point. They

suggest they are uncertain that Saddam has the weapons, and

likelihhod of development, and worry that in the process of attacking

we might trigger the use of whatever Saddam does possess

much to the detriment of his own people and those he would strike.

I’m asking you for a general summation on the efficacy of containment as we know it.

Mr. Chairman, I don’t have further questions.

I have nothing further.

Mr. Chairman, I’d just ask this of this panel. Is

there any evidence that Saddam Hussein is giving weapons of mass

destruction information, parts, weapons themselves, to terrorists,

broadly defined, whichever group? And if he was doing so, would

there be any fingerprints of this? How would we know? Does anyone

have a comment on that?

Ambassador Butler.

As Professor Cordesman has said, in ascribing

these theories of conspiracy, we need to find evidence. I don’t think

you can base whatever action our government wants to take upon

supposition, however well founded, as some have argued in the

press, and this is why I raised the question with each of you, and

I appreciate your responses. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, the chairman suggested, I think,

a dispensation of 45 minutes?

Oh. all right.

Very well.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am

struck, listening to the testimony this afternoon, by some parallels

with our thinking after September 11. Many of us went into a

crash course on Islam, and events in several countries of the world

where not enough attention had been paid for a long time as to history

and development. We sought to gain some idea of why people

do the things they did, what the motivation was.

Beyond that, we have been involved in an effort, and the distinguished

Senator from West Virginia is taking leadership in this, to

determine what deficiencies we have in our intelligence systems.

Why we do not know more, and why we were not better informed?

Here we have a situation which clearly we need to know much more.

We are all saying today we have not found the evidence, but

somebody will ask why not; given the resources of this country, extraordinary

abilities that we have, and the imperative need. The

same question, as Dr. Gallucci knows, from North Korea has been

asked for a long time. The usual comment was that people did not

understand the language. They could not insinuate themselves in

the country. There were all sorts of dodges and weaves.

But here the life of the country is at stake. We are about to take

very grave, important actions, and it just appears to me that—it

is not entirely the role of this committee, but each one of us had

best become much better informed about Iraq. I am struck by your

comments, Mr. Duelfer, that it makes a big difference who succeeds,

but I am even querying the question, what are the alternatives?

Who knows that much about the internal politics of Iraq these days?

Now, there are Iraqi exiles who meet frequently in this town and

elsewhere, and maybe among them are leaders that will have the

backing of the Iraqi people. In other words, to come to the conclusion

that somehow or another, the Iraqi people are going to condemn

Saddam and fight to re-take their country. But as we heard

this morning from Dr. Cordesman, this was not always the case in

the past. We were surprised by nationalism, feelings of patriotism,

however despicable the leaders, because they did not trust us, either.

In other words on what basis do we believe, or what must we do

to have a constituency in Iraq that really wants democracy in any

remote form like the kind that we try to produce in this country,

or in Western Europe? Who might have at least the backing in a

way that Mr. Karzai, apparently through the loya jirga in Afghanistan

has some consent? But even then he must contend with the

war lords around him, and other people that seek to stop progress.

Now, absent some analysis of what the politics are, and who is

there, then we really do have a rather long occupation. The thought

of a parallel between Japan or Germany is a real leap in terms of

the institutions that are available that might bring about some

semblance of Western democracy, so I raise the question, how do

we get up to speed? What are the resources academically and governmentally

in this country that are likely to identify for an informed

argument the post Saddam situation? How do we even gain

a sense in terms of public diplomacy, of enlisting the Iraqi people

to understand life will be better if, in fact, we intervene, or if we

stay, or if we try to produce capitalism, democracy, or whatever we want to do there?

Mr. Duelfer, I will start with you. Would you respond to that?

How do we do that? What brings that about?

Why do we think they would? Why would Iraqis

say, we need a strong government, Saddam is a bad leader, but on

the other hand we need somebody who knows where to go? This degree

of participation and vigorous debate is a large part of the process.

Does anyone else have a comment on the intelligence,

or how we gain people in Iraq?

And the neighbors are a real problem, as you point out.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me try to offer

a road map. What if we took the position that the panel this morning

mentioned, especially Ambassador Butler, and many of you

mentioned today, that essentially we fought a war militarily, the

U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution, but unfortunately for

a variety of reasons Iraq did not comply. In due course Iraq anticipated

we would not enforce compliance, which we have not, but

leaving aside whether Saddam is close to developing a nuclear

weapon we go back to the U.N. Security Council friends and say

we must take this threat seriously.

So whether it is containment light or containment heavy, we

must try to enforce what Secretary Powell has negotiated. We must

be pretty hardnosed about it and say, we are going to stop anything

restricted from coming in and out of Iraq as far as we can.

We are going to enforce the no-fly zones almost to the point that

we occupy in the air those two zones, so you are squeezed.

In other words, leaving aside all of the speculation over intelligence

we do not have, we do those things which are ordained now

by the United Nations, by all of our friends.

Now, second, we carve out $80 billion for a potential operation.

That is a large sum of money. That is twice the bill that we were

debating today on prescription drugs for the elderly for 2 years,

and so it is a big sacrifice, but we understand that that is what

we are going to do. We carve that money out, but then at the same

time we adopt, as President Bush did before, a United Way campaign

to try to gain donations. Now, who is going to pay for $80

billion? We take for granted that we are all going to do this, this

is what is required, and we are all in this together. We are in the

United Nations, we fought a war, and we have a problem here.

We finally do the best we can intelligence-wise, either reform, or

in some way really put an emphasis on this threat. Further we

commit to educating ourselves about Iraq, internal political options,

who is there, what might happen, so we have at least some reasonable

idea, if something did happen to Saddam what the alternatives may be.

Now, at the end of the day Saddam is, pressured in all of these

ways. We set aside the money. We begin thinking in terms of a

force of hundreds of thousands of people. We bvegin to collect commitments

of money, bases and forces. This is critical, as we heard

from Mr. Cordesman, we overused 23 bases last time. So in order

to be credible they have got to be available again.

So we put very great pressure upon everybody, now that we are

credible, to open up these places. Now, maybe Saddam gives up,

but probably he does not, and so in the course of all of this, ultimately

something happens. Now, we have already come to a point

where we have done a lot of planning, and we have people in motion.

We have congressional support by this time. Some weeks have

passed. We have had some more hearings.

The thing that I worry about at the end of the day is not that

Saddam would fall in the process of all of this, not are we prepared

for it but still this aftermath of what comes after Saddam. I am not

discouraged today. Maybe this is sort of an enlightened aspect of

this hearing, that there are not people in Iraq that may be prepared

for democracy as we know it. Suggestions are, in fact, an enlightened

democracy might even lead to more terrorists being

spawned out of the process.

What if a liberal democracy is developed as we have in India,

and they develop a nuclear weapon. In spite of all of our protests,

and we say, well, they are friendly, unlikely to use that on us, but

they might use it on someone else. Consequently a lot of our diplomacy

will be focused on trying to prevent that. Why did they develop

one? Why is Iran’s development any more benign, as Senator

Brownback brought up?

The question that I have is, at the end of the day, what if we

end up with a regime in Iraq that because of a sense of nationalism,

or threats from Iran, decide to maintain weapons of mass

destruction just like the same way India and Pakistan. Would we

then just hope they are more friendly, and therefore unlikely to use

it on us. That is a very, very queasy objective, much like the end

of the last war with this resolution that was never enforced.

Now, that is why I think we need much more thinking, Mr.

Chairman, on what is an alternative at the end of all of this. After

we have sketched out how we win the war, how we get the allies,

what do we have left, we still have not heard what will happen.

Some express hopefulness that there is a charismatic figure somewhere

in Iraq today, or outside of Iraq, that might come in, or several

of these people who somehow might bring about a different style of life for people.

Now, we are experimenting with this in Afghanistan. There are

big changes there. Women are going to school and having basic

rights. This changes the whole concept that half the population of

most Muslim states are disenfranchised and out of the picture.

As you pointed out, if all this began to occur in Iraq, what would

the neighbors think? How about the Saudis? How about anybody

in the neighborhood? Do they accept this? How many years, and

how many people do we have to have there to make certain those

who are doing these incipient democratic things have time to do it?

And so that is a part of the situation I think we need to sketch in

some more, Mr. Chairman.

The military side of it is not complex. Most Americans are not

prepared to spend $80 billion and several hundred thousand people

in readiness and deployment, but that we can do. We have been

through that before, and we still have not come to a successful conclusion

in Iraq, or at this point certainly even in Afghanistan, and

that seems to me to be critically important.

I do not really ask for anybody to comment. This

is sort of my own editorial, unless somebody has a thought about it.

That is our entre´ back into the international

community.

That is interesting, compensating these people.

Good idea. Thank you very much.

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Francke, you point out that the Iraqis would welcome the

United States as liberators initially. But then, ominously, in your

second paragraph, the humanitarian crisis will become acute and

the system of law and order will break down, there will be a vacuum

of authority, intense jockeying for power, and several of the

neighbors may attempt to influence the process and preposition

themselves to affect the outcome. That’s sort of a logical sequence, but all pretty dismal.

Both you and Professor Marr have suggested that the identification

of leadership will be extremely difficult. If it’s imposed by the

United States without roots in Iraq it will present a set of difficult

problems. But there’s not much experience—in fact, very little experience

with democracy or liberal institutions, and it would be a

difficult time for institution building and all of this.

And all of you, including—Colonel Feil, go into this in much more

detail trying to outline exactly how many American troops and/or

civilian personnel are likely to be required to meet the problems of

law and order, humanitarian distress, general disestablishment in all of this.

The importance of this hearing is really for this testimony to

begin to sink in. Whether you are accurate to the last paragraph

or not, the fact is that our experience in American foreign policy

in Somalia after Americans were attacked and dragged through the

streets was to get out. That was a debate on the Senate floor—immediate

withdrawal, no sense of nation building. In fact, ‘‘nation

building,’’ in quotes, became something we definitely, as a policy,

were not going to be engaged in.

Tremendous debate then when we tried to intervene in Bosnia

with our NATO allies, because this was perceived, once again, as

sort of the thing end of the wedge of nation building. Likewise, the

debate on this in Kosovo.

And, finally, of course, we have some experience in Afghanistan.

It’s instructive that, at the time of our military operations in Afghanistan,

we simultaneously began preparing an plan what was

going to happen in the future. After, we had a national emergency,

and we moved rapidly. Fortunately, Chairman Karzai was available,

the king was available, a good number of able people used a

lot of agility in trying to think through how the loya jirga could be

supported, and we’re still at that point.

But just before the testimony today, as you perceived, we had a

business meeting in which we adopted a very significant resolution

with regard to assistance to Afghanistan—$3.5 billion over 3 years.

Now, that’s a fairly modest sum, given what we’re talking about

today on Iraq any way you parse the figures. And this is just a bill

coming through the Foreign Relations Committee. It has not

passed the Senate as a whole. The administration may or may not

support such an idea. And, in fact, this appears to be a debate as

to really how extensive American forces, either military or others,

ought to be in Afghanistan. And this is a war in which we have

been engaged, as opposed to one in which we might be engaged.

So I mention all of that to say that as the public focuses on your

testimony through this hearing they will discover this is a very

daunting process. Any way you look at what is being suggested

today, there is enormous expense and commitment of people as

well as treasure for a number of years. And it’s one country in the

middle, as we heard yesterday, of a neighborhood of countries that

may, in fact, feel very threatened by democracy if it did evolve in

Iraq, and that democracy won’t necessarily prevail all around this

new Iraq. And it’s not clear to me where the leadership is going to come from.

Now, some of you have suggested a coalition of forces, and that

makes sense. And, in a way, the Afghan government is based upon

that idea. But it’s not clear to most of us who are not scholars in

the politics of Iraq, as you are, as to who conceivably might be in that coalition.

Now, you can think of various factions and parties and elements.

But physically, do any of you have any idea about personalities—

people, individual leaders—in Iraq now or outside of Iraq that

might, in fact, be a part of a coalition? If you were asked, in the

midst of hostilities with Iraq, who should the United States back

in terms of trying to put together a coalition that might work, that

might be this transition, do any of you know who it is and who has

experience at doing this sort of thing?

And if not, what do we do? In other words, do we try to identify

persons in advance? Do we sort of hope that someone from the military

or from the Ba’th party or from the opposition to the Ba’th

party or from anybody, people may emerge, identify themselves, coalesce?

In other words, I don’t see how this happens, even though I see

the daunting circumstances that you describe. Can any of you give

an idea as to who physically might offer leadership? Or if you don’t

want to name somebody for fear that person would be jeopardized,

can you give some sense of confidence that there are such persons

who might understand democracy, some semblance, finally, of our

foreign-policy objectives, which—after all, we got into this war to

get rid of weapons of mass destruction. Who is going to lead us to

the caves or the laboratories or whatever it is so we can destroy

it, as opposed to somebody in Iraq who says, ‘‘Now, I have a second

thought about this. As a matter of fact, Iraq may need some of

those weapons to deal with Iran or to be a great power or what have you.’’

We will have fought a war to get to these weapons of mass destruction,

and while we’re trying to rehabilitate Iraq, we suddenly

have a government that says, ‘‘Iraq first. We’re nationalists. And,

as a matter of fact, we want to progress with weapons of mass destruction.’’

Now, is there anybody in this picture that can give us some hope

that a war is worthwhile if, in fact, our objective is to get rid of

the weapons of mass destruction, in that a government would be

consistent with our policies sufficient to at least achieve that one

basic item of foreign policy. Does anyone want to respond to that? Dr. Marr.

Well, from that answer, I gather, first of all, that

the Iraqi exiles with whom our government is meeting outside, you

believe, would solve this foreign policy problem. That’s going to be

a very strong argument for our administration to back those people.

But what you’re also saying is you need almost a Douglas

McArthur to impose a constitution and regime once we get there,

and that is well beyond the bounds of most American thinking at this point.

Now, after McArthur gets there, or his substitute, in the Iraqi

sense, then, hopefully, the constituent assembly begins to identify

indigenous leaders. I’m trying—in terms of a program that the

American public might understand—to set these challenges out in

stages as you have identified them. Now, we need to apply some

dollar figures and troop levels to these issues so we have a fuller

understanding of what is required.

This is a whole lot more, in response to the chairman’s question,

than I hear anybody in our administration talking about. Now,

there may be, as the colonel has said, an annex to the overall plan

that, in a hopeful way, suggests some things that might occur.

But what you’re testifying about is a lot of people, a lot of money,

and quite a bit of risk. If the plan works and we are successful

there will be many in the neighborhood who don’t agree or support

our efforts. Given what we’re doing in Afghanistan, we are talking

about a very modest amount, as opposed to the amount that would

be needed in Iraq. At some point, the administration has to come

to some policy conclusions in Afghanistan, which may be a predictor

of what would occur in the much more complex country we’re discussing today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me overrun my time. No.

Mr. Chairman, let me just say that the testimony

has led me to believe, first of all, that the need for planning

in other parts of our government, in addition to the Defense Department,

is extremely important. I say that because I suspect—

from the testimony we heard yesterday, we identify Saddam Hussein

as a unique menace. There are bad leaders all over the world,

but this is really, by far, the worst. He has successfully brutalized

the country, created enormous problems in terms of nutritional deficiency

for the children, lack of income for most of the population.

In essence, by trying to maintain power, he has created a lot of

problems for the Iraqi people, quite apart from the menace that he

presents to the neighborhood.

So having established this as an extraordinary circumstance that

might justify authorizing the President of the United States to go

to war, it seems to me we must try to identify the fact that it would

be best if we went to war with a lot of other countries, including

the neighbors, including NATO allies, and including the Russians,

as a matter of fact.

Now as I have heard the testimony today—we’ve identified the

fact that Iraq has great resources—among them, oil. What if, in our

planning, the United States Department of Commerce or the Treasury

Department has thought through why some of our allies have

been lukewarm about our military planning. Namely, that they

have either debts that Iraq owes or oil concessions. In other words,

even while we’re doing the difficult work, business as usual might

be created, not only for the Iraqis, but for them.

We would say that’s not really the way that it’s going to work.

This is not economic imperialism, but, in fact, as a part of our plan

for Iraq, in addition to identify the political leadership and the coalition

and building democracy, we’re going to run the oil business,

for example. We’re going to run it well. We’re going to make

money. And it’s going to back to help pay for the rehabilitation of

Iraq, because there is money there.

Now, furthermore, if you want to be involved in that business,

whether you’re Russians or French or whoever, you must be with

us in the beginning of this business. We’re going to set up the business

together. We’re going in together. Because once we get there,

we’re going to control the oil business.

I take that as a good point of departure, because that gets people’s attention.

But there is no point whatsoever in our going to

rescue all the people of Iraq, the Russian debt, the French oil concessions,

if our efforts are met with opposition and criticism. As the

chairman has identified, our efforts in Iraq cannot stop after the

threat has been removed. It is in our national interests that a stable, peaceful Iraq emerges.

I’m suggesting, to be provocative today, that we do have a plan.

It must be more than a military plan, and it must result in attracting

a broad coalition. If our statesmanship is adept, we will have

the Russians aboard, the French will be with us, so will a lot of

other people, and we will deal with the Iraq problem together. This

will ensure a much greater chance of success, rather than being

identified as the unique invaders, the unique enemy.

Now, it may be that Arab sentiment will end up disliking the

Russians, disliking the French, disliking the Germans, the English,

all of us. But it could be, as a matter of fact, that if the oil business

makes money, and we pump 5 million barrels a day, as opposed to

two, and the Iraqi people begin to thrive. Some people might like

this idea, in fact, this new incipient democracy will have something

to work with, as opposed to poverty and destruction and rehabilitation

that may or may not occur.

Now, given that provocative idea, does anyone have a comment?

It might, and you make a very good point. My

only thought would be that it is conceivable that there are issues

in the Middle East, including Israel and Palestine, that might take

many, many years. One reason we’re having these hearings is that

we may be on the threshold of a war now. So ideally, it would have

been desirable to have cleared everything up before military action——

But that, I suspect, is not really in the cards.

Senator Biden has asked me to preside, and I recognize Senator Hagel.